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Introduction: 
Internal debt, external debt and economic transformation 
The topics of internal debt, external debt and the process of adjustment and economic transformation 
have special features which distinguish them from each other. But they also have important 
interrelationships, often obscure, which must be studied with care. This issue of the CEPAL Review 
takes up these three topics, with emphasis on their interrelationships. 
The Latin American experience of the last 15 years has demonstrated the risks of rapid financial 
deregulation. When this deregulation occurred swiftly (Chile, Argentina and Uruguay), the financial 
system experienced real domestic interest rates far in excess of any reasonable figure. 
Before deregulation, interest rates in the domestic financial systems were low or even negative in 
real terms. This led, inter alia, to a situation in which debt owed to the financial system was a very 
large component in the assets of enterprises. But capital, another important component in such 
assets, usually represented a relatively low proportion thereof. Certain fiscal policies helped to 
accentuate this phenomenon by allowing interest payments to be treated as costs, thus reducing 
profits and therefore profits taxes, and by forbidding similar treatment of the dividends paid to 
shareholders and other holders of the capital. 
This situation was sustainable as long as interest rates remained very low or negative in real 
terms. But when the financial system began to experience high interest rates, the existing debt 
entailed interest payments incompatible with the regular income of the enterprises. They were then 
forced, firstly, to refinance their payments of interest and even of capital to the financial system, and 
then to freeze them, with the result that the investment portfolios of financial institutions became 
less secure or even irrecoverable. 
When at the same time the level of economic activity declined, both the costs and the incomes of 
enterprises were affected, and they were forced to transfer the problem to the financial system. 
This process was not synchronous in all enterprises or in all sectors of the economy, but as time 
passed it was clearly becoming more widespread. Accordingly, the institutions of the financial system 
did not all perceive the problem in the same way at the same time, although sooner or later the system 
itself was affected: the level of debt at the higher interest rates became unsustainable and action by the 
State in support of the financial system inevitable. 
The first three articles in this issue, prepared as part of the Joint Project UNDP/ECLAC "Implica-
tions for Latin America of the International Monetary and Financial System", consider the topic of 
internal debt from a general standpoint and in terms of two specific cases: Colombia and Peru. It is of 
particular interest to analyse the positions of these two countries, for in general terms they are two of 
the best known cases in the Latin American region. 
For a long time Colombia maintained stable economic policies with no abrupt changes in the 
degree of control or in the openness of the financial system. These stable policies helped to limit the 
scope of the problem and prevent the widespread financial difficulties encountered in the countries of 
the Southern Cone. In Peru enterprises succeeded in transferring to the rest of the economy a 
substantial part of their financial difficulties; the problem thus produced a very sharp drop in real 
wages and in fiscal revenue rather than declines in production and increases in unemployment. 
The risks of rapid financial deregulation were demonstrated with particular sharpness when this 
deregulation was combined with equally rapid financial openness. Although deregulation coincided 
with high domestic interest rates, openness offered the possibility of avoiding them, at least partially, 
by incurring foreign debt, for interest rates in the international financial markets were moderate and 
in some cases negative in the currencies of their countries of origin. Accordingly, the assets of 
governments, enterprises and private individuals began to show an increasing proportion of direct or 
indirect external debt. This process stimulated rapid expansion in the international financial markets. 
When the years of the lean cows arrived, in other words when the growth in the world economy came 
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to a halt, when interest rates in the international markets rose and the terms of trade deteriorated, it 
became impossible for the region to continue the normal servicing of its external debt. 
In the debtor countries government support for enterprises and private individuals was not 
sufficient to cope with the external debt. This support might have been sufficient if the responsibility 
for the foreign debt had not ultimately fallen, for contractual reasons or through international 
pressure, on the governments of the debtor countries themselves. When these governments accepted 
responsibility for the foreign debt, they were also forced to apply the brake to their national 
economies, thus aggravating the problem of domestic debt. The suspension of the flows of external 
financing was followed by several rounds of renegotiation which managed merely to defer the 
problem. 
Three articles in this number of the Review deal with external debt. The first of them, prepared in 
ECLAC's Division of Economic Development, takes up the important topic of economic transforma-
tion in the light of the limitations imposed by the transfer of resources abroad occasioned by the debt. 
The second article, revised and updated specifically for this issue from a work produced by the Latin 
American Economic System (SELA), studies the possibility of converting the external debt into capital 
and draws attention to the difficulties and problems of such conversion. The third article, prepared in 
ECLAC's Mexico City Office, studies the external debt of the Central American countries, which have 
perhaps received less attention because their absolute levels of debt do not seem high, although some 
of them have the highest figures for external debt in proportion to their product or population. 
Faced both with an unsustainable domestic debt situation and with a foreign debt which cannot be 
regularly serviced, the debtor countries are being forced to adopt policies of economic adjustment and 
transformation to deal with the situation. In the case of domestic debt the financial system and the 
debtors must improve the make-up of their assets, increasing capital in proportion to debt; it is also 
necessary to allocate resources more efficiently and to stimulate saving to underpin rapid capital 
accumulation. In the case of the external debt, as well as generating the resources for repayment it is 
important to transform these resources into currencies acceptable to the creditors; the emphasis must 
therefore be on the production of internationally marketable goods and services, which often requires 
changes in the production structure and not merely in profit incentives. 
How can these adjustments and this transformation be achieved? This question has arisen 
persistently in recent years. The traditional methods were devised mainly to deal with isolated cases, 
so that when they are given general application they acquire a clear recessionary bias which must be 
corrected. 
The last two articles in this issue of the Review, prepared as part of the project on "Macroeco-
nomic policies and the adjustment process in Latin America" which is being implemented by ECLAC in 
collaboration with the Netherlands, deal with the topic of adjustment. The first of them does so on the 
basis of the Latin American experience, emphasizing both the internal rigidities of the economies and 
the need to consider the problem of adjustment from a global perspective. The second and last article 
views the problem from an opposite perspective, taking the existing theoretical focuses and setting 
them against the Latin American situation in order to determine whether they are applicable thereto. 
Thus these articles examine three interrelated topics: internal debt, external debt-and the process 
of adjustment and transformation. They indicate two fundamental lessons. The first is that stable 
policies are more important than the ideal policies which certain fashionable models seek to carry to 
extremes. The stability of policies depends not only on their intrinsic quality but also on the political 
support which they obtain; if this support is to be sufficiently broad, the policies will have to 
guarantee a fair distribution of costs and benefits among all population groups and across frontiers. 
The second lesson is that policies cannot be analysed as if each of them pursued a goal separate from 
the goals pursued by the others. A policy of high interest rates which succeeds in increasing saving and 
reducing the external deficit can be destroyed by its harmful effects on the financial system as a whole. 
An exchange policy devised to restrain inflation can heap imbalances on the external sector which 
cause it to explode with greater force. An adjustment policy designed to reduce the external deficit of a 
small country can prove counterproductive if many other countries apply it at the same time; or it can 
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prove completely useless if the policies of the bigger countries do not leave it sufficient room for 
manoeuvre. Economic policies must therefore be considered carefully as a whole, both in the case of a 
single country and in the case of the entire international community. 
Carlos Massad 
